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ABSTRACT 
While it is well established that community members should participate in resilience planning, participation 
with genuine decision-making power remains rare. We detail an end-to-end disaster impact reduction 
modelling framework for infrastructure networks, embedded within a scenario-based participatory approach. 
Utilising the AF8+ earthquake scenario, we simulate hazard exposure, asset failure and recovery of 
interdependent critical infrastructure networks. Quantifying service levels temporally offers insights into 
possible interdependent network performance and community disconnection from national networks, not 
apparent when studying each infrastructure in isolation. Sequencing participation enables feedbacks between 
integrated modelling and participants’ impact assessments. Shared ownership of modelling outputs advances 
stakeholders’ understanding of resilience measures, allowing real-time implementation, increasing 
community resilience. Readily understood by central government, this format may increase support and 
resourcing, if nationally significant. Finally, this method tested integrated modelling and impacts 
assessments, identifying and enabling improvements for both. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Communities require essential services, such as electricity, 
transport, telecommunications (including calls, texts and data), 
and three waters to be able to function. These essential services 
are provided by infrastructure networks, such as electricity 
lines, roads, fibre optic cables and sewerage, which are often 
highly interdependent. Damage to infrastructure, often caused 
by natural hazards (such as earthquakes), can result in the 
partial and sometimes complete loss of a given community’s 
essential services for considerable periods of time. The 
interdependence of infrastructure networks can compound 
service loss. Impact on one network is likely to have cascading 
negative consequences for other networks, reducing the service 
level provided by other networks, and increasing the time 
required to restore networks [1]. Accordingly, the modelling of 
infrastructure networks’ asset failure, interdependencies, and 
recovery are ongoing foci of disaster management research 
worldwide, however, these models are not often well integrated, 
which can lead to conflicting results [2,3]. As a result, end-to-
end hazard-to-impact-to-recovery modelling for infrastructure 
networks remains a research gap. 
Furthermore, the need for infrastructure resilience is ultimately 
driven by the need for community disaster resilience [4-6]. It is 
established that community members should participate in 
attempts to increase resilience to disasters. Normative 
reasoning suggests that people have a right to participate in 
decision-making which affects them, and pragmatic reasoning 
suggests that participatory processes deliver higher-quality 
outputs (than those without participation) [7,8]. However, 
community participation involves substantial time and effort, 
when all stakeholders have limited time, resources, and interest, 
restricting their capacity to participate in or facilitate additional 
activities [8]. For example, existing commitments such as work 
and family can limit community members’ ability to participate, 
and limited time and resources can similarly discourage project 
leaders from facilitating intensive participation [8]. Further, 
while community members often participate in disaster impact 
reduction efforts, community participation with genuine 
decision-making power remains rare and difficult, including in 
the context of increasing infrastructure resilience [9-11]. 
Davies [12] introduces a scenario-based participatory approach 
to enable successful collaboration among community members, 
researchers, and practitioners, for disaster impact reduction. 
The benefits of inclusive, participatory approaches have been 
well established, and include better quality decisions and better 
identification of vulnerabilities, as well as more empowerment 
of locals, greater perceptions that decisions are fair, reduced 
conflict, and increased trust in decision-makers (see Reed [13], 
for a summary). Davies’ approach uses a scenario as a boundary 
object to enable collaboration between community members, 
researchers, and practitioners [12]. “Boundary objects” are 
‘objects which both inhabit several intersecting social worlds 
and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them. 
Boundary objects are… a means of translation’ (Star and 
Griesemer [14], p. 393). Numerous studies have shown that 
boundary objects can enable successful collaboration between 
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researchers and practitioners, without compromising either 
group’s identity, integrity or autonomy, when all stakeholder 
groups perceive the boundary object as credible (scientifically 
and technically accurate), relevant, and legitimate (fairly 
reflecting stakeholders’ divergent views and interests) [14-17]. 
Accordingly, within disaster impact reduction projects, natural 
hazard scenarios have proved to be successful boundary 
objects, enabling knowledge co-production and establishing 
ongoing relationships [18-21]. 
To integrate community members into this established 
scenario-based approach with genuine decision-making power, 
Davies [12] combines and sequences participatory 
methodologies, following Aoki [9]. Sequencing participation 
allows different stakeholder groups to participate more 
intensely at different stages during the overall process, focusing 
on relevant areas. For example, community members gain more 
influence assessing how a disaster will impact the community 
but have lower influence over assessing technical infrastructure 
restoration times (which infrastructure providers gain more 
influence over). Sequencing participation also helps to 
overcome barriers to participation by reducing the time 
commitment required from each stakeholder group, as 
discussions of most interest to individual stakeholder groups 
can be held without requiring all participants. This also helps to 
constrain and ensure credibility, reducing potential confusion 
which can be caused by non-experts debating and speculating 
about the needs and outcomes of parameters they know little 
about. For example, network infrastructure providers may 
speculate about community post-disaster needs but may have 
little specific idea. Equally, community members may guess 
network restoration times but are unlikely to know these. 
Combining different participation methodologies can further 
overcome barriers to participation. Methodologies with a range 
of participation intensities can be used so that participants who 
can commit more time are encouraged to, but those who cannot 
commit the same amount of time can still participate, and do 
not have to be excluded from the process entirely. 
Therefore, in this paper, we aim to: 
1. Develop an end-to-end disaster impact reduction modelling 
framework for infrastructure networks which considers 
direct and indirect impact, cascading network disruption, 
network interdependence, and resulting recovery processes; 
and 
2. Embed this framework within a scenario-based 
participatory approach for disaster impact reduction to: 
i. advance cross-sector understandings of the 
implications of disruption to, and recovery strategies 
for, infrastructure networks; 
ii. increase the effectiveness and shared ownership of 
disaster impact reduction efforts; and consequently, 
iii. increase community resilience to future hazard 
events. 
Notably, this approach couples hazard models (ground shaking, 
landslides) with the modelling of failure, disruption, and 
recovery, across national-scale interdependent networks. 
Combining this integrated modelling with community- and 
practitioner-elicited recovery priorities creates feedback loops. 
These iteratively highlight vulnerabilities, areas to be revised, 
and new areas to be considered, in the integrated modelling and 
in practice. Further, the integration of community members and 
practitioners allows greater understanding, ownership, and 
ultimately application of this research, thus increasing 
community resilience. 
Accordingly, we aim to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What is required to integrate hazard and infrastructure 
modelling, including direct and indirect impacts, cascading 
network disruption, network interdependence, and resulting 
recovery processes, to provide end-to-end impact 
assessment for infrastructure networks? 
2. What value is gained by developing an end-to-end model 
for infrastructure networks? 
3. How might a scenario-based participatory approach 
incorporate an end-to-end impact assessment model to 
advance both infrastructure and community resilience in an 
integrated way? 
4. What is required to ensure that such scenario-based 
participatory approaches incorporate ongoing participant 
outputs to ensure that disaster impact reduction efforts 
continue to iteratively build on improvements in shared 
understanding?  
THE AF8+ SCENARIO 
Recent earthquake disasters in Aotearoa New Zealand (2010-
11 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, 2016 Kaikōura 
Earthquake) have demonstrated the potential fragility and 
interdependence of infrastructure networks, the extent to which 
communities depend upon infrastructure networks, and the 
value of pre-event infrastructure resilience efforts [22-24]. 
These lessons have informed a strong national drive to increase 
the resilience of infrastructure networks, which has included the 
creation of a New Zealand Thirty Year Infrastructure Plan [6]. 
Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 
[26], New Zealand government agencies at local, regional and 
national levels, infrastructure providers (often termed “lifeline 
utilities”), and emergency services, all have defined functions 
and responsibilities for disaster readiness, reduction, response, 
and recovery. Section 60, for example, requires every lifeline 
utility to be ‘able to function to the fullest possible extent, even 
though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an 
emergency’ (p. 40). Lifeline utilities must also establish 
planning and operational relationships with their regional Civil 
Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group under the 
Act. In most regions, lifeline utilities predominantly fulfil their 
duties under the act by participating in regional lifelines groups, 
with national representation and coordination undertaken by the 
New Zealand Lifelines Council (est. 1999). Regional lifelines 
groups frequently undertake regional-scale vulnerability studies 
[27-29], post-event debriefs [24, 30, 31], and other work 
fostered or contributed to by the Groups, such as annual 
emergency management exercises at national, regional, and 
local scales [32], and numerous centrally-funded research 
initiatives which have streams dedicated to researching natural 
hazard impacts on infrastructure (including the Resilience to 
Natures Challenges, resiliencechallenge.nz; QuakeCoRE, 
quakecore.nz; Economics of Resilient Infrastructure, 
naturalhazards.org.nz; DEtermining VOlcanic Risk in 
Auckland, DEVORA, devora.org.nz; and East Coast Life At the 
Boundary, eastcoastlab.org.nz). This work often develops 
valuable inter-personal and inter-corporate relationships and 
has improved resilience [23, 24]. However, there has been 
growing recognition that greater community involvement in 
infrastructure resilience planning is required, both from 
domestic experience and international research [4-6]. 
The Alpine Fault (Te Waipounamu/South Island, New Zealand) 
is an earthquake source capable of producing impacts of 
national significance. The Fault forms the onshore boundary 
between the Pacific and Australian tectonic plates, 
accommodating the majority of plate relative motion, up to 28 
mm/year [33-35]. The Alpine Fault generates Mw 8+ 
earthquakes several times per millennium and is late in its 
current seismic cycle, with an estimated ~30% probability of a 
major rupture in the next 50 years [36-39]. 
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The Alpine Fault was considered a sufficient potential risk that 
Project AF8 (projectaf8.co.nz) was commenced in 2016, to 
undertake detailed planning for future major South Island 
earthquakes. Focusing on a 7-day Alpine Fault magnitude 8 
earthquake scenario, based on decades of prior research activity 
[40], Project AF8 ran six regional and one national response 
planning workshops, aiming to integrate regional and national 
planning. In total, more than 500 participants attended these 
workshops, including emergency managers, policymakers, 
lifeline utilities, and community representatives, amongst 
others [41]. The intended outcome was the South Island Alpine 
Fault Emergency Response (SAFER) framework [42], focused 
on identifying likely impacts and addressing these through 
strategic planning and coordination activities. 
This study builds on the initial Project AF8 scenario, using an 
up-scaled scenario that considers the 10 years following the 
initial earthquake, introduced by Davies [12], termed the 
“AF8+ scenario”. The AF8+ scenario allows a shift in focus 
from reactive short-term response to analyses of longer-term 
recovery, and was designed as part of a participatory process, 
according to project goals established by community members 
in Franz Josef, New Zealand, and subsequent discussions with 
practitioners [12,43]. In 2015, Franz Inc., Franz Josef’s 
business collective, invited academics from the University of 
Canterbury and the University of Auckland to assist them to 
develop a planning strategy to increase the resilience of the 
town. Subsequently, a complex participatory disaster impact 
reduction process has developed. Several participatory groups 
aiming to increase the resilience of Franz Josef have developed, 
including the community members’ and Universities’ 
collaboration, and a process led by the district and regional 
councils, both including a wide range of stakeholders. Herein, 
we present findings based on the AF8+ scenario, informed by 
findings from workshops which enabled engagement between 
researchers, infrastructure stakeholders, disaster managers, and 
community members [12]. 
This paper details expected societal disruptions due to 
infrastructure damages up to 180 days (6 months) following the 
initial AF8+ event, including those caused by the aftershock 
sequence and resultant landslides. We seek to address: 
1. the locations most vulnerable to infrastructure losses for 
extended periods of time; 
2. the magnitude and spatial extent to which disruptions 
spread due to the interconnected and interdependent nature 
of the South Island infrastructure networks; and 
3. temporal changes in infrastructure network functionality 
during the recovery process, up to 180 days. 
METHODOLOGY 
Integrated Disaster Impact Reduction Modelling 
Framework for Infrastructure Networks 
Our framework for simulating the cascading network disruption 
and recovery processes following major hazard-induced 
damage to interdependent infrastructure networks is presented 
in the grey boxes in Figure 1. The framework comprises five 
components: (A) Infrastructure Model, (B) Hazard Scenario, 
(C) Failure Propagation, (D) Disruption Metrics, and (E) 
Recovery. Each of these components is briefly outlined below 
and discussed in more detail by Zorn et al. [44,54]. 
In the first component, (A) Infrastructure Model, spatial 
infrastructure asset data are assembled to produce functional 
and topological geospatial network models, where networks are 
represented as graphs of nodes and edges represent discrete 
single point assets (such as water pumping stations or 
reservoirs) and connections (such as pipelines between these 
nodes), respectively. Nodes are identified as sources, where 
resources or services are generated, and sinks, the final points 
of delivery of the network services. The connectivity of source-
sink paths within and between networks creates a functional 
pathway representation of these networks. User demands are 
allocated to each individual source and sink node based on 
“business as usual” statistics adopted from asset 
owner/operator-provided statistics, publicly available reported 
statistics, or spatial distribution/collection zones intersected 
with census data to provide an estimate of populations 
dependent on assets. These user demands are distributed along 
the functional pathways to create weighted flow network 
representations. Using these network models, initial asset 
failures or disruptions are assumed based on the network assets’ 
intersection with the modelled hazard extents in (B) Hazard 
Scenario. Such approaches are established within the literature 
[2,21,45] and have been used in a range of infrastructure risk 
and vulnerability studies globally, including studies of 
interdependent infrastructure vulnerability assessment for New 
Zealand [44,46]. 
Components C, D, and E (Figure 1) then follow an iterative 
process for each modelled timestep, forming a feedback loop. 
First, (C) Failure Propagation enables the propagation of 
network failures both within a network and between networks 
where dependency connections are broken and no redundancy 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual diagram of the integrated disaster impact reduction modelling framework for infrastructure networks 
(indicated by light grey boxes) embedded within the Davies [12] scenario-based participatory approach. The dashed, dark grey 




or rerouting of service flows are possible within our modelled 
network configuration. (D) Disruption Metrics then computes 
various consequence metrics. We define Direct Disruptions as 
the population/number of users adversely affected due to failed 
assets within the same network, such as a damaged water 
treatment plant causing a reduction (or removal) of water 
provision to downstream customers. By contrast, Indirect 
Disruptions result from failures which are initiated beyond the 
specific network of interest due to functional dependencies on 
other networks, such as an undamaged water treatment plant 
unable to function due to a lack of electricity supply. The spatial 
outage extent is delineated by the intersection of spatial 
footprints of failed components and dependent user catchments 
or distribution/reception zones. 
Steps A-D represent the state of the disrupted infrastructure at 
a snapshot of time (t). For the next timestep (t + Δt), the final 
component, (E) Recovery, reinstates asset functionality of 
previously failed assets (where appropriate). This implies that a 
restoration process or provision of a permanent redundant 
supply has occurred to provide pre-event service levels. 
Integrated Disaster Impact Reduction Modelling 
Framework for Infrastructure Networks Embedded within 
a Scenario-Based Participatory Approach 
The above integrated disaster impact reduction modelling 
framework for infrastructure networks was then embedded 
within the Davies [12] scenario-based participatory approach, 
as shown in Figure 1. First, all stakeholders collaborate to 
define the scenario, to ensure that the scenario is perceived to 
be relevant by all participating groups [8,47-50]. Second, the 
hazard scenario is developed, as discussed above (Step B in 
Figure 1). Third, an impacts scenario is co-created through a 
range of combined and sequenced participatory methodologies 
[12]. In this way, the impacts scenario acts as a boundary object 
between participating groups, creating an ongoing feedback 
loop. As new information about likely damage, disruption and 
recovery priorities is provided to the impacts scenario by one 
stakeholder group, other stakeholder groups are able to 
incorporate this new information and, if necessary, alter their 
own assessments. 
The impacts scenario also functions as a boundary object to 
embed the integrated disaster impact reduction modelling 
framework for infrastructure networks into the scenario-based 
participatory approach. As new damage, disruption and 
recovery assessments are created by participants in workshops, 
these can be modelled after workshops to show resulting 
implications for cascading network disruption, network 
interdependence, and the effect on recovery. This results in a 
feedback loop between the integrated modelling and ongoing 
disaster impact reduction work being undertaken by 
participants. This feedback loop enables the iterative 
integration of modelling outputs within the impacts scenario 
and as a result, this information can be understood and 
immediately used by community members and practitioners. 
APPLICATION 
In this section, we briefly summarise the application of the 
scenario-based participatory approach to the AF8+ scenario, as 
detailed by Davies [12]. Notably, this method was developed 
for a context where community members had invited academics 
to assist them to develop a planning strategy to increase the 
resilience of their town. We then step through and expand on 
the application of each of the modelling framework components 
(Figure 1) to the AF8+ scenario. 
The Scenario-Based Participatory Approach to the AF8+ 
Scenario 
A scenario-based participatory approach was designed by 
Davies [12], as follows: 
1. Identify need: 
Work with community members to establish their most pressing 
collective needs, based on the community’s unique social, 
economic, cultural, and political context. Identify which need is 
going to be addressed through the process. 
2. Design participation: 
Select other stakeholder groups associated with the identified 
need (e.g. council, emergency managers, lifelines, scientists, 
business groups). Work with each stakeholder group to design 
a series of participation opportunities, discussing: types of 
participants; modes of recruitment; modes of communication; 
and the roles of participants [9].  
3. Develop scenario: 
In consultation with the participating stakeholder groups, 
decide on an appropriate scenario, relevant to the identified 
need. Develop this scenario (Figure 1; B). 
4. Co-create scenario: 
The series of participation opportunities allows stakeholder 
groups to further develop the scenario in a sequence. Provide 
both the previously developed scenario and the co-created 
outputs from other stakeholder groups’ participation as inputs 
for subsequent stakeholder groups’ participation opportunities, 
so that additions to the scenario continually build on all 
previous outputs (Figure 2). 
Each workshop co-created the impacts scenario. Workshops 
used the findings of previous workshops to inform the impacts 
scenario. Recovery estimates were also input into an integrated 
framework to model infrastructure interdependencies which 
iteratively informed the impacts scenario and future workshops. 
Separate workshops were held with Franz Josef community 
members, Westpower, ground transport operators (the New 
Zealand Transport Agency and KiwiRail) and road contractors 
(Fulton Hogan and MBD Construction), and the West Coast 
lifelines committee. Civil Defence Emergency Management 
(CDEM) representatives participated in all workshops, 
followed by a “combined” workshop.  
Infrastructure Model (A) 
We adopt the spatial infrastructure asset data and functional 
network models of Zorn et al. [46] across the energy (electricity, 
petroleum), transportation (road, air, ferry, rail), water & waste 
(water supply, wastewater, solid waste), and 
telecommunications sectors (mobile), with the addition of a 
further wired telecommunications network. In each of these 
models, major assets are represented. Table 1 provides an 
outline of the node/edge representations for each of the studied 
networks across the South Island. Figure 3 presents (a) the 
mapped faults of the South Island of New Zealand and (b) the 
spatial distribution of assets for all networks. For visual clarity, 





Figure 2: Schematic of the Franz Josef natural hazards scenario-based participatory workshops (each solid box represents a 
workshop [12]. 
Table 1: Network asset representations as nodes and edges with counted values representing the number of exposed assets in 
this scenario based on the national models of Zorn et al. [44, 46]. Nodes are those assets representing a single asset in space 








63 generation sources, 48 transmission and 289 
distribution substations 
Transmission and sub-transmission 
power lines 
Petroleum 5 bulk storage facilities, 431 retail petroleum stations 
Connected via state highway 
Network 
Telecommunications 
Landline 322 exchanges, 2313 cabinets Fibre and copper connections 
Mobile 1053 mobile transmitter towers Connectivity to wired network 
Water & Waste 
Water supply 585 source, treatment, pumping, or storage nodes 




354 pump station or treatment assets Major collection pipelines 




855 bridges/tunnels State highway classified roads 
Rail 16 stations Rail tracks 
Air 13 Airports 
Flight routes (41 domestic, 4 
international) 




User demands are allocated to each of the individual nodes and 
edges presented in Figure 3 using statistics adopted from asset 
owner/operator-provided statistics, publicly available reported 
statistics, or spatial distribution/collection zones, intersected 
with the smallest publicly available census area unit (~100 
permanent residents each). For this paper, we represent direct 
road transport impacts based on disruptions to passenger 
transport disruptions to allow for a comparable metric across 
infrastructures (i.e. population). Further, with island-wide 
traffic counts only available for state highway classified roads, 
all dependencies are routed through this network with any 
assets not directly accessible from a state highway are 
connected to the state highway via their shortest path. With the 
majority of shaking occurring on the West Coast (Figure 3b), 
we consider this a reasonable assumption. Such dependencies 
represented across the network models are provided in Figure 4 
[44]. It should be noted that these are assumed for normal 
network connectivity and are assumed to be consistent 
throughout any recovery processes. Where specific 
connectivity pairs are unknown, edges are assumed to the 
closest appropriate asset either geographically or through a 
shortest path connection route. 
Hazard Scenario (B) 
To create the AF8+ hazard scenario, Davies [12] extended the 
AF8 scenario from 7 days to 10 years (herein we focus on the 
first 180 days). Some hazard severities were reduced for the 
AF8+ scenario, as these were originally heightened to 
emphasise the emergency response planning focus within 
Project AF8 [40, 54] (e.g. removal of a 1-in-100 year rainstorm 
on Day 3 and large magnitude aftershocks and landslides in 
each CDEM region). 
The AF8+ scenario adopts the AF8 scenario northeast-directed 
411 km rupture of the Alpine Fault between Fiordland and Lake 
Kaniere (F2K) with corresponding ground shaking determined 
by Bradley et al. [51] (Figure 3). While this aspect of the 
scenario was considered highly uncertain by the Project AF8 
science team, it was adopted given the frequency of reverse-slip 
earthquakes at the southern end of the Alpine Fault in recent 
decades [36] progressing from a SW to NE direction [52,53], 
and because it produces stronger ground shaking in populated 
areas on the west and east coasts than comparable scenarios 
[40,41]. 
A new, 10-year aftershock sequence was created by transferring 
the aftershock sequence from the 2002 Mw 7.9 earthquake on 
the Denali Fault, Alaska. Co-seismic landslide exposure was 
determined through the approach of Robinson et al. [55]; a co-
seismic landslide hazard map at 60 m resolution was produced 
(based on the shaking intensity, slope angle, slope position, and 
distances to streams and faults), from which exposure estimates 
for the infrastructure networks were used to determine landslide 
locations. The rainfall sequence was transferred from the 
previous ten years of South Island rainfall data. Earthquake 
rupture, earthquake shaking, rockfall exposure and landslide 
reactivations were determined through expert judgement. Fault 
rupture was based on intersection with the location of the 
Alpine Fault in the NZ Active Faults database. Earthquake 
shaking damage was based on building construction type. 
Landslide reactivations were chosen based on increasing risk 
values (most likely landslides under the co-seismic landslide 
approach were reactivated). Debris flows were not included as 
 
Figure 3: (a) South Island faults, including the Fiordland to Lake Kaniere (F2K) section of the Alpine Fault, and (b) spatial 
distribution of studied infrastructures with respect to MMI shaking intensities used in the AF8+ scenario, converted from 
Bradley et al. [51]. Inset map shows plate tectonic context of New Zealand and the Alpine Fault. 
 
Figure 4: Simplified representation of the directed 
dependencies modelled from Zorn et al. [44]. An 




hazard scenario components due to time constraints, but 
academics did discuss these with participants. 
Failure Propagation (C) 
Each individual network asset is assigned one of three initial 
functionality states as a direct result of the shaking and landslide 
models described above. These correspond to i) complete 
disruption, ii) some interim level of functionality, or iii) no 
disruption (normal pre-event service is provided). 
Disruptions were derived from locations where assets 
intersected the AF8+ scenario modelled fault rupture, shaking 
intensities (using Modified Mercalli Intensities, MMI, see 
Figure 3b), and landslide runout footprints, with infrastructure 
stakeholders providing further input regarding local geology, 
asset vulnerability, and likely impacts on the assets, based on 
recent experiences, including responses to storm-induced 
landslides and the 2016 “Kaikōura” earthquake. Expected 
recovery times were also derived. In applying these failures, 
where alternative source-sink connectivity paths do not exist, 
all dependent nodes/edges are assumed to be disrupted. To 
reduce data requirements and model complexities, we assume 
no capacity constraints at network edges and nodes, and we 
make further assumptions based on expert advice regarding 
reliabilities of supply (or levels of service) provided by specific 
networks throughout the AF8+ scenario. For example, 
electricity supply networks could be expected to provide 
intermittent service to end-users given the potential for power 
cuts following an earthquake due to aftershocks and voluntary 
disconnections for inspection or repair. In such cases, the 
interim level of functionality is assumed. 
Disruption Metrics (D) 
The consequence of asset failure is quantified based on the total 
user disruptions after allowing for redundancies and rerouting. 
Under full disruptions, all dependent users are considered 
disrupted. Under partial disruption, the number of additional 
users affected is assumed to be half of what would be expected 
under full disruption: representing the ability of an 
infrastructure network to provide partial service. Further, for 
some network functions (namely solid waste movements, 
wastewater solids disposal to landfills, and petroleum delivery 
to retail outlets), if rerouting is required, potential user 
disruptions are assumed to be a function of the increase in travel 
distance, as per Zorn et al. [44]. Disruptions are defined as being 
either initiated by direct or indirect causes, with indirect 
disruptions potentially attributed to multiple sources. 
Recovery (E) 
For this application, due to current data availability, we have 
focused on five timesteps: 0-1 days (the initial impacts in the 
first 24 hours), 3 days, 7 days, 30 days, and 180 days. Individual 
asset recovery rates were assumed from a range of studies on 
the Alpine Fault [21, 56] and local vulnerability studies [28]. 
These were updated using preliminary findings from the 
scenario-based participatory approach, integrating the 
modelling as shown in Figure 1. 
RESULTS 
Franz Josef Community Workshop, Saturday 28th 
October 2017 
Franz Josef community members made detailed estimates of the 
community’s post-disaster capacity. In summary, the 
community expected Franz Josef to have: 
 2000 tourists to account for and evacuate; 
 3 satellite phones; 
 5 helicopters; 
 48 hours triage medical supplies; 
 4 days of food for tourists; 
 2 weeks of food for residents; 
 10 days of diesel; and 
 20 days of petrol. 
Community members also anticipated: 
 Being without road and mains power access for at least 6 
months; 
 Immediate satellite communications; 
 Cell reception restored within a week; 
 Evacuating injured as highest priority, all tourists within 7 
days (as a goal), and then residents of the town who wish to 
leave. Evacuations were expected by helicopter, which 
were expected to back-load essential supplies for residents. 
To maximise participation and increase relevance, this 
workshop was adjusted to focus on emergency response, as 
community members felt that they had not had enough response 
practice. This meant that discussion of long-term implications 
of the scenario (e.g. economic viability) was limited. However, 
importantly, community members stated that they would wish 
to remain living in Franz Josef throughout the recovery.  
Westpower Workshop, Monday 30th October 2017 
West Coast regional electricity outages are shown in Figure 5. 
Westpower stakeholders noted that the repair of their electricity 
network is dependent upon the national supply and road access. 
As the first infrastructure provider contributing to the AF8+ 
scenario, both of these dependencies had to be assumed in the 
workshop. Participants chose to assume that road access would 
not inhibit the repair of the electricity network, noting that this 
would be reconsidered in a later workshop. However, it was 
noted that substations would run out of (back-up) power supply 
after one week, and that once substations run out of power, they 
may not be able to be restored. Key findings are detailed as 
follows: 
 Westpower would run out of supplies and gear (poles, cross 
arms, fuel, etc.) within one week, if these are unable to be 
replenished from outside the West Coast. 
 Within one month, mains power is expected to be restored 
to Franz Josef, if the Waihapo power plant is still 
generating. 
 Within six months, participants were fairly confident that 
all power stations between the top of Westpower’s region 
down to Franz Josef would be restored. Fox Glacier would 
have an isolated power supply. 
 The restoration of the electricity south of Franz Josef would 
depend on government priorities and road access. This 
would be a large investment across a large area for a small 
population. 
Ground Transport Workshops, Thursday 2nd November 
and Tuesday 5th December 
Key findings from workshops with ground transport operators 
and road contractors are detailed below, and South Island State 
Highway outages are shown in Figure 6. South Island rail 
network outages were also established but are not shown 
because it was expected that there would be no rail service on 
the East-West line, including for the West Coast west of 






































































































































































 All ground transport access to the West Coast will be closed 
for weeks. 
 Limited public road access to Franz Josef is expected to be 
restored within six months. 
 After restoring access to Franz Josef, NZ Transport Agency 
would prioritise the repair and improvement of re-opened 
roads over re-opening other damaged roads, unless the 
Government made these roads a priority. 
 Permanent road closures may occur, including Arthurs 
Pass, Haast Pass to Franz Josef and the Coast Road between 
Greymouth and Westport. Restoration of these routes 
would depend on long-term government priorities. 
 Permanent closure of the rail network west of Springfield 
may occur, depending on government priorities. Without 
road access through Arthur’s Pass, the rail cannot be 
repaired. 
 Closing the road (without any form of public access) for 
longer will speed road restoration. 
West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, Tuesday 21st 
November 2017 
The focus of this workshop was to discuss interdependencies 
between the State Highways, rail, and Westpower electricity 
networks’ impact assessments, co-created in previous 
workshops, and also to discuss the interdependencies between 
these networks and the other lifeline utilities. Key findings from 
this workshop were as follows: 
 Fuel management will be critical for all lifelines with no or 
limited road access. 
 Rail is critical to the long-term survivability of the milk and 
mining industry on the West Coast. 
 Telecommunications were noted as a key dependency. 
However, telecommunications providers unfortunately did 
not attend the workshop, limiting both assessment of 
telecommunications outages and recovery times.  
Integrated Modelling Findings 
The modelled spatial extents of infrastructure network outages 
over time are shown in Figure 7. Shading indicates the number 
of infrastructure networks providing a complete or interim level 
of disruption to normal service. Timesteps of 0 and 3 days are 
combined as interim service levels are expected, i.e. no 
complete recovery to pre-event levels is simulated. 
Recovery (to full pre-disruption service levels) propagates from 
the north, east, and south-east, after day 7. This is largely due 
to the more rapid re-instatement of interim/partial levels of 
service due to available resources (physical and human) located 
in these areas and less damage to the major assets represented 
in the models. At the larger timesteps (30 days/ 180 days) the 
West Coast region still shows substantial infrastructure 
disruptions: either complete or at some interim reduced level of 
functionality. Much of these disruptions can be attributed to the 
requirement for alternative source-sink connectivity paths for 
petroleum delivery, solid waste movement, and sewage 
disposal, with any deviation from normal pre-event service 
levels highlighted in Figure 7. Updating model simulations with 
new network arrangements (i.e. the definition of normal, 
interim, and no service) should be a focus in future research. 
Many infrastructure recovery trajectories correlate closely to 
electricity network function (Figure 8a). While electricity 
providers advise the potential for “islanding” of electricity 
within the West Coast region within 180 days if the national 
grid is unable to be reconnected [12], some locations within the 
West Coast region may remain without, or with intermittent, 
electricity supplies. Regardless of location, in this (or any 
similar) scenario, infrastructures dependent on electricity 
within the West Coast region should continue to consider 
potentially widespread use of back-up electricity sources to aid 
initial recovery. 
This dependence on electricity is also reflected in Figure 8b, 
where the majority of user disruptions, across the presented 
time frame, can be attributed to indirect failures: predominantly 
disconnections in electricity supply. At t = 0, direct damages 
(combined across all infrastructures) account for 40% of the 
cumulative user disruptions with 60% externally initiated. With 
redundant electricity supplies, the proportion of indirect 
electricity-initiated disruptions would be expected to decrease 
(particularly for the mobile and wired telecommunications 
sectors which represent a combined ~2 million potential user 
disruptions at peak) and/or be reassigned as indirectly-initiated 
disruptions, due to reduced road, water supply, or petroleum 
access, amongst others. Explicitly incorporating redundancies 
and their attributes/dependencies into the modelling framework 
(e.g. battery life, generator refuelling requirements, and road 
access) would be a valuable extension to this research and 
should be incorporated as data for this become available. 
“Combined” Workshop, Monday 12th March 2018 
The final workshop in this process brought together 
representatives from all stakeholder groups that had 
participated in the previous AF8+ workshops, for the first time 
in the process. Each stakeholder groups’ scenario assessments 
and integrated modelling findings were presented and 
discussed. Workshop discussions focused on implications for 
the Franz Josef community and regional infrastructure by 
leveraging the detailed national-, regional- and local-scale 
assessments already completed within the targeted workshops. 
The summary of community response and recovery capacity, 
contrasted against the capacity of Lifelines to respond, 
highlighted current preparedness shortcomings. The modelling 
contextualised the stakeholder-assessed impacts on a national 
scale, and additionally highlighted further dependencies. In 
particular, practitioners and community members identified 
dependence on road access and petroleum supplies to be the 
greatest limiting factor throughout the recovery phase, whereas 
the modelling highlighted dependence on electricity. 
Through collaborative discussions in the workshop, disaster 
impact reduction strategies were then co-created. For example, 
Franz Josef community members identified that they would be 
severely impacted locally, have limited resources and a large 
population to support, and would be isolated. Practitioners were 
able to confirm that the community would be inaccessible via 
ground transportation (i.e. State Highways) for months (Figure 
6). Further, road operators identified that, due to the magnitude 
of damage, attempting to open the State Highways would 
require a structured, centrally-led and resourced response, 
meaning that in the immediate response, their locally-based 
roading contractor staff could be of more use to communities 
by helping to repair local infrastructure, as opposed to 
attempting to re-open the State Highways.  
Additionally, given the modelled criticality of restoring the 
electricity network, practitioners discussed prioritising the 
repair of local roads to enable critical power supplies to be 
restored. Subsequently, the community identified that this 
infrastructure prioritisation, alongside self-rationing to ensure 
critical supplies would last, could enable Franz Josef to remain 
habitable to community members who wished to remain (as 






















Figure 7: Spatial extents and number of infrastructure disruptions across the South Island. Darker red cells indicate a higher 
proportion of disrupted infrastructure services (either full disruption, or some reduced level of functionality/reliability compared 
to pre-event services) where the green end of the spectrum may indicate just a single infrastructure is not offering full 
functionality. Greyed out cells representing normal pre-event functionality (or areas without any permanent residents). 
Figure 8: (a) Infrastructure network functionality for the South Island of New Zealand in terms of users disrupted (or passenger-
kilometres restored for state highways) and (b) the attribution of disruptions to direct or indirect causes (via interdependencies) 
combined across networks. A selection of Wellington (ferry/air) and South Island bound transport passengers (air) is also 
included. 

















Directly caused disruptions (%)            42 42    31   26 73 





We have presented an application of an end-to-end modelling 
framework for earthquake shaking and landslide hazards 
coupled with interdependent critical infrastructure network 
models and the corresponding recovery processes. This 
integrated modelling immediately highlighted several 
discussion points for those concerned with reducing the impacts 
of major South Island disasters. The vulnerability of the West 
Coast region of the South Island is clear, as are the expected 
extended recovery times for many dependent infrastructures 
due to major disconnection from the transportation 
(predominantly state highway) and electricity networks. Given 
the mountainous setting and (resulting) financial cost, 
increasing connectivity (and therefore redundancy) across the 
state highway network is unlikely to occur. Therefore, 
improving and/or maintaining asset robustness should be a 
priority. For electricity, ongoing work by network 
owner/operators to introduce embedded generation (local 
generation sources connected to the distribution network 
reducing the reliance on the national grid), and backup supplies 
in critical areas within the West Coast region, should 
substantially benefit the local resident populations while aiding 
timely recovery for dependent infrastructures. 
Embedding the end-to-end modelling framework within the 
scenario-based participatory approach had three obvious 
benefits for disaster impact reduction. First, simulation of 
failure, disruption, and recovery across national-scale 
interdependent networks allowed community members and 
practitioners to use the modelled impacts to advance their 
assessments of likely disruption and recovery strategies. 
Second, it helped to translate the relative importance of the 
spatial extents and number of infrastructure network outages 
(Figure 7) in relation to communities’, and particularly Franz 
Josef’s, post-disaster capacities, and so their ability to recover. 
Third, this method allowed testing of integrated modelling and 
impacts assessments, as community members and practitioners 
identified vulnerabilities, enabling appropriate adjustments to 
modelling and relevant disaster impact reduction measures 
implemented by community members and practitioners. In 
short, the modelling highlighted areas requiring increased focus 
in practice, while practitioners and community members 
highlighted necessary improvements for models. Road access 
and petroleum dependence were not accurately represented in 
the curves of Figure 8, as the dependencies represented in our 
model highlight the connectivity required for normal operation, 
as opposed to any new or changing dependencies arising to 
enable recovery. Additionally, the potential indirect disruptions 
due to petroleum shortages across the West Coast region during 
the recovery process are not immediately visible in Figure 8b. 
This is due to the modelling approach that defines user demands 
based on private car refuelling as opposed to petroleum 
demands for recovery works. Further supply shortages, for 
those restoring various infrastructure network functionalities, 
could substantially change the curves presented in Figure 8a, 
with the potential for cascading delays across multiple 
networks. 
Moreover, coupling the integrated infrastructure modelling and 
the scenario-based participatory approach created a valuable 
feedback loop (Figure 1), which was enabled by sequencing 
participation. As new damage, disruption, and recovery 
assessments were identified by workshop participants, they 
were incorporated into the modelling to show resulting 
implications for cascading network disruption, network 
interdependence, and effects on recovery. Community 
members noted that this feedback loop, enabled by sequenced 
participation, critically added credibility to their impact 
assessment by extrapolating the national level implications of 
the integrated community assessment of local damage, and so 
translating their assessment into a format which is readily 
understood by government at a national level. In turn, this 
increased the likelihood of central support and resourcing for 
relevant national-level disaster impact reduction efforts for the 
community. Embedding modelling within the scenario-based 
participatory approach also increased the shared ownership of 
the modelling and allowed both community members and 
practitioners to (in some cases immediately) implement disaster 
impact reduction measures at the local and regional levels in 
response to the implications of the modelling [12]. For example, 
a Franz Josef business owner noted that “from a business point 
of view, knowing likely outage times, as shown on the maps 
used in the workshop [Figure 5; Figure 6], is very useful for 
crisis management.” 
Notably, willingness to participate was critical to the success of 
this process, both in terms of being able to use stakeholder 
impact assessments to model infrastructure impacts, and in 
terms of collaboration to increase disaster preparedness. While 
lifeline utilities are legislated to improve disaster readiness, 
reduction, response, and recovery [26], the additional 
leadership and willingness to participate in this process shown 
by the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, and in 
particular the New Zealand Transport Agency and Westpower, 
greatly aided this process. Moreover, the drive shown by 
community members to start the process, and the unwavering 
commitment of community members to increase the resilience 
of Franz Josef, cannot be understated as essential to the process. 
This may have been partly enabled by the tight-knit and remote 
character of this community, as it has been established that 
place attachment and strong connections between community 
members (including government employees) can enable 
compromises for the good of the community [9,57,58]. This is 
not to say that participation was easy. The scenario lacked some 
credibility insofar as national telecommunications and 
electricity providers/distributors did not engage with the 
process. This increased the influence of other stakeholders, 
particularly academics, on the scenario, as best judgement was 
used as a substitute for participation. Further, while complete 
participation is a near impossibility for any project of this scale, 
when key personnel were unable to attend, this affected, and in 
some instances limited, discussions. While part of the project’s 
success was due to the close collaboration between researchers 
and the West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group, closer 
collaboration could have encouraged more participation. 
Utilising a wider range of participation methodologies beyond 
exclusively organising workshops could have increased 
participation in the process. Moreover, making the project a 
formal West Coast Engineering Lifelines Group project may 
have encouraged participation from telecommunications 
providers. Legislation is also an option which has been 
successful in New Zealand at effectively mandating 
collaboration between infrastructure companies and emergency 
managers [26]. Clarifying and, if necessary, strengthening this 
mandate could greatly increase necessary collaboration 
between community members and lifelines organisations. 
Several extensions to this work are required both to i) assess the 
generalised recovery strategies and priorities across a wider 
range of potential hazard event scenarios that are both in 
progress and proposed, particularly building on the need to 
focus on recovery, and not just on the initial response; and ii) to 
improve the application of the integrated framework in future 
projects.  
This paper has outlined an approach to enable the integration of 
knowledge between community members, researchers, and 
practitioners, and has highlighted the benefits of end-to-end 
disaster modelling and of using a scenario-based participatory 
approach to integrate this modelling with preparedness 
assessment. Further, this paper has proved that using a scenario 
as a boundary object and sequencing participation also enables 
the integration of autonomous participant initiatives within the 
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scenario-based participatory approach introduced by Davies 
[12]. This suggests that different autonomous initiatives (in 
addition to integrated infrastructure modelling) could be 
integrated by any participating group. Overall, the collaborative 
linking of scientific, technical, and community knowledge 
offers great potential to increase resilience of socio-technical 
systems in preparing for future events such as the anticipated 
Alpine Fault rupture. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has addressed its research questions as follows: 
1. An end-to-end disaster impact reduction modelling 
framework for infrastructure networks has been outlined. 
This integrated direct and indirect impacts, cascading 
network disruption, network interdependence, and resulting 
recovery processes. 
2. When applied to the AF8+ Alpine Fault earthquake 
scenario, this integrated modelling immediately highlighted 
several discussion points for those concerned with reducing 
the impacts of major South Island disasters, particularly 
around extended recovery times for many dependent 
infrastructures due to major impacts to electricity and 
transportation (predominantly state highway) networks. 
Improving and/or maintaining asset robustness should be a 
priority, as should ongoing work to introduce embedded 
generation and backup supplies in critical areas within the 
West Coast region. 
3. The end-to-end modelling framework was embedded 
within a scenario-based participatory approach [12] by 
using a scenario as a boundary object and sequencing and 
combining participatory methodologies [9,15]. This created 
a feedback loop. As community members and practitioners 
outlined their assessments of likely damage, disruption, and 
recovery priorities, these were used to advance the 
modelling, and modelled outputs were then fed back into 
the participatory approach. This highlighted vulnerabilities 
within integrated modelling and impact assessments by 
community members and practitioners, improving both. 
4. Critically, the feedback loop increased the shared 
ownership of the modelling, consequently allowing both 
community members and practitioners to (in some cases 
immediately) implement disaster impact reduction 
measures due to the implications of the modelling, 
increasing community resilience to future hazard events. 
Further, the modelling also translated the integrated 
community assessment of local damage to national 
implications, allowing the community assessment to be 
communicated more clearly to national government, 
increasing the likelihood of relevant national-level disaster 
impact reduction policies for the community. 
This application particularly highlighted the criticality of 
sequencing participation to the scenario-based participatory 
approach. Beyond the genuine two-way communication 
required to ensure that boundary objects are perceived by all 
participants to be relevant, credible, and legitimate [15], the 
participatory approach [12] benefits from sequencing that 
enables feedback loops to occur, as assessments iteratively 
build on the current best shared understanding. 
Overall, this approach has been very well-received by 
community members and practitioners, having addressed two 
key needs: integrated modelling and genuine community 
participation. The willingness of community members and 
practitioners to participate was essential to this success. The 
process would benefit from further validation, evaluation, and 
numerous improvements (many identified herein), but clearly, 
future research in this area is likely to be both highly valuable 
and highly valued. 
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